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Abstract  
The article examines epistemological and ontological underpinnings of 
reasearch performed by means especially of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). It takes as its guiding line the thesis, set forth by Rom Harré, 
that instruments such as barometers or thermometers do not cause the states 
they measure into existence, whereas apparatuses cause the material states into 
existence which are subsequently processed (treated, measured, etc.) according 
to suitable methods (e.g. algorithms). Accordingly, when the objects of 
examination (brains, e.g.) are subjected to 2 or more Tesla in fMRI (a strength 
of magnetic field never occuring in earthly nature), the technical means 
literally create the states to be examined. 
Close examination of the functioning of fMRI indicates that brain states, e.g., 
are not simply read as degrees of temperature or measured on some scale. 
Thus, mental functions as fMRI outputs remain invisible, for the outputs have 
been semantically processed on the basis of quantum mechanical events 
according to translation procedures built into the fMRI device. 
Keywords: apparatus; instrument; measurement; imaging; experiment; fMRI.3 
1. Introduction 
The decade of the brain would have been inconceivable without some 
groundbreaking technical means such as functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI). This technique yields images of human and non-human 
brains with colorful blobs that are supposed to (strictly speaking) 
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differentially signal areas of cerebral activity. Though differing in outlook and 
size, all MRI machines are doing the same job when performing imaging tasks 
especially for cognitive neuroscientists. These machines are conventionally 
described and propagated as devices designed for capturing areas of brain 
activity.4 ‘To capture’ is merely a different word for ‘to measure.’ However, 
the process of measuring brain activity by way of fMRI (if we stick to the 
conventional terminology) differs greatly from measuring temperature by 
means of quicksilver thermometers or from measuring atmospheric pressure 
by means of barographs. The difference turns out to be not of linguistic, but 
rather of ontological as well as of epistemic nature. In what follows, we 
reconstruct the said difference and thereby focus on the distinction, suggested 
by Rom Harré (2003), between instruments and apparatuses. 
Why deal with fMRI techniques against the background of the instrument 
vs. apparatus distinction? The outputs of fMRI, the brain images with colorful 
blobs, have induced some neuroscientists to believe that scanners permit them 
to “watch the mind at work”, as Hobson & Leonard (2001, 14) put it. This and 
similar claims indisputably enhance fascination by, and admiration for, fMRI 
based neuroscience in the general public. However, they also have been 
contradicted by other neuroscientists who concede that “fMRI is not and never 
will be a mind reader” (Logothetis, 2008, 869). This contradiction cannot be 
solved by better techniques, better equipment, better computer programs, or 
better experimental designs. The purpose of our contribution is to argue for the 
need to avoid the contradiction at stake from the outset by reflecting on what 
fMRI data are. 
More often than not, neuroscientists interpret fMRI outputs in a way that 
what they see does in fact also occur in nature. Whenever a fMRI scanner is 
operating, the device is said to provide a “window into the brain” (Parry & 
Matthews 2002, 50). To put it differently, a fMRI scanner is perceived and 
used as if if its purpose were to lift some kind of curtain in order to disclose 
the brain as it really is. Following a proposition of Harré (1998, 353-354), we 
believe that many neuroscientists uncritically adopt the classical account of 
scientific experimentation according to which experiments reveal some aspect 
of the world as it is (here: the brain and/or brain function as is). However, the 
underlying assumption then entails that the experimental setup can be 
eliminated from the interpretation for good, in the very same sense that 
thermometers are eliminated from the act of collecting data by reading 
temperatures.: When the thermometer within a glass of water displays 25° C, 
one interprets this as the device showing the real state of something real in the 
real world (i.e. the water in the glass) and not as the state of the device itself. 
In other words, we would say that “the temperature of the water has 25° C" 
 
4See Siemens’s homepage: https://www.healthcare.siemens.de/magnetic-resonance-imaging as well as 
Phillips’s homepage: https://www.usa.philips.com/healthcare/solutions/magnetic-resonance. 
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and not “the subjects of the thermometer is 25° C” because the top of its 
quicksilver column has come to rest at the 25° C mark. According to this 
underlying assumption of transparency,5 the experimental procedure can 
be epistemologically discarded. Applying the principle of transparency to 
any fMRI scanner generated data output, one expects that the device 
reveals some state of affair on something in the natural world as it is, in 
the very same way as the thermometer gets epistemologically discarded in 
the above example of taking the temperature of the water. The 
interpretation of fMRI data along these lines as revealing brain activity as 
it is is likely to have contributed to fMRI’s growing popularity and its 
suggestive power in the larger public. In the remainder of this 
contribution, we argue that such a transparency favoring interpretation of 
fMRI is both mistaken and misleading. Hence, if follows from this thesis 
that the underlying epistemology of fMRI − an epistemology not yet 
adequately described − must be different. Following Harré’s (2003) 
conception of scientific experimentation, we will endeavor to show that 
fMRI provides models of brain physiology by means of a sophisticated 
technique of data production, whose relation to the natural phenomena (the 
phenomena of brain physiology) is opaque and indissolubly melted with 
the machinery’s workings in their entirety. 
2. (Functional) Magnetic resonance imaging 
Our main argument rests on the basic difference between instruments 
(such as thermometers, seismometers, barographs, myographs, and similar 
devices), on the one hand, and apparatuses (such as MRI-machines or 
particle accelerators and similar devices), on the other hand (according to 
Harré 2003). 
The key issue is as follows: in what sense does an apparatus such as a 
MRI device truly differ from an instrument such as a thermometer? There 
is no simple, straightforward answer to this question. Technical 
information is indeed not only useful, but truly necessary in order to 
understand one characteristic feature of MRI machines, viz. that these 
machines first cause material states into existence which are subsequently 
processed physically and digitally. In contradistinction, thermometers do 
not cause material states that they are expected to measure. To put it 
differently: understanding the ontological and epistemic specificity of a 
device such as a MRI machine, one needs to know first what it does, 
technically speaking, in order to grasp and further process analytically 
what it has previously done. 
 
5 This is both Harré’s (1998, 355) terminology and the argument that rests on the concept of 
transparency. 
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So let us look for a while into the standard MRI device in action in a 
neuropsychological lab or in a neurological/neurosurgical ward. The object of 
investigation is living matter (the brain of a human or non-human animal)6 
subjected to a magnetic field of one or more tesla (T).7 The intensity of 
magnetic fields within the range of 1,5 T to 4 T or more produced by the 
magnetic coil of the scanner is absolutely uncommon in nature (of the planet 
we inhabit), for one T corresponds to the intensity of earth magnetism 
multiplied by 20,000. Which is to say that a human being undergoing MRI 
(and/or fMRI) examination is exposed to 30’000 or 40’000 or 60’000, and 
sometimes even stronger natural magnetic fields that cause innumerable single 
modifications in the living matter of the head.8 But note: the brain (or, for that 
matter, the hip, the gut, etc.) is not (i.e. without intermediate procedures) made 
the key target object of MRI machines in action; rather, any magnetic field of 
e.g. 2, 2.5, 3, or 4 T aims at changing the behavior of protons. Thus, the 
immediate target objects are the protons and their changing behavior in atoms 
in molecules within bunches of molecules within tissues within organs such as 
brains within organisms such as humans. 
Indeed, it is a fact (well confirmed by modern physics, but here grossly 
simplified in its rendering), that the subatomic particles called protons may 
also be defined as displaying the properties of magnets. An external magnetic 
field thus causes their orientation to change accordingly. Moreover, protons 
possess a spin, which adapts to the presence of a magnetic force. These two 
properties are at the base of well working MRI machines. The protons inside 
the living organism, excited by the oscillating magnetic field, emit, in reaction 
to the ‘artificial’ magnetic field, radio frequency signals that are registered by 
the receiving coil of the scanner. The signals thus received are processed in 
such a way as to encode position information obtained by means of gradient 
coils, the function of which consists in varying the magnetic field. 
Though quite incomplete, the basic information on MRI given here is 
sufficient to purport our thesis that scanners are not instruments that permit 
one to proceed to any ‘brain reading,’ and even less so to any ‘mind reading.’ 
Scanners cause phenomena into existence that are destined to be processed so 
that information extracted from the processing be then conveyed to observers. 
What observers ‘read,’ if they read anything in the strict sense of the term, on 
screens or photograph-like outputs, are visualizations of proton configurations 
that are brought to behave according to what we might call a ‘physico-
technico-digital experimental protocol.’ Thus, in MRI, nature as it is and 
 
6 However, MRI is also good for the study or the diagnosis of other parts of a living body, such as the 
belly of a dog, the broken knee of a hippopotamus, or the painful bladder of a patient in some hospital. 
7 Experimental MRI machines of the most recent generation work with up to 8 T; we discard them here 
as well as so called ‘open’ MRI machines which run on low magnetic fields. 
8 In comparison: any human being, and thus any human brain, is exposed e.g. in California, USA, to a 
magnetic field of 35 microtesla. 
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nature as read by observers are, strictly speaking, ontologically 
incompatible with one another. They are nevertheless epistemologically 
related to one another by means of highly complex ensembles of physical 
equipment, signal creating and signal receiving devices, signal processing, 
statistical algorithms, and visualization programs implemented into the 
scanner and its assistant devices such as desktops to be looked at, but 
designed so as to turn the final output into nicely readable images. 
The presence of protons in organic molecules determines the amount 
of signals received by the receiving coil. This is to say that tissues, 
differing from one another by their chemical composition, and thus by the 
amount of protons ready to specifically react to the magnetic field 
produced by the machine, emit signals of different radio frequency 
depending on their chemical properties. In the case of fMRI, the key 
neurological theorem underlying the imaging procedures tells us that 
active brain regions demand higher affluence of blood than less active 
regions. Increments of blood in circumscribed brain regions cause an 
increase of signals emitted by the protons in the molecules of both the 
living matter in action in that cerebral area and the blood whose quantity 
has increased due to the cerebral activity in the respective region. 
To sum up: In fMRI studies, the data that in the end yield brain images 
with colored blobs signalling cerebral activity, are neither neurocognitive 
nor neuroontological, but, as one could say, artificially brought about by a 
device that triggers signals according to theorems of quantum mechanics. 
It follows from these considerations that fMRI ‘embodies’ materially very 
complex properties that hinder one to treat scanners as members of the 
species of instruments according to Harré’s (2003) definition explained 
above. In addition, the setup of scanners requires from experimental 
subjects to adopt a very unnatural behavior.9 
3. The concept of experimentation 
It is a remarkable fact that philosophers of science would focus upon 
the relationship between theory and experiment in order to understand 
whether, and how, theories can be tested. Whereas the members of the 
Vienna Circle, e.g., aimed at showing that theories are amenable to 
verification by observations, Popper’s critical rationalism held that 
 
9 Note also that the subjects in fMRI studies are compelled to rest motionless in a narrow scanner bore 
while signaling the solution of tasks by minimally moving nothing but some fingers. Such restrained 
behavior is highly ‘unnatural,’ but essential for the successful performance of neuropsychological 
experiments under fMRI condition. But this ‘unnatural’ pattern of behavior is fundamentally different 
from the ‘unnatural’ action of a magnetic field of one or more T upon protons in the brain of 
experimental subjects, although both − the pattern of behavior and the magnetic field-brain complex 
within the scanner bore − are paradigmatic for the laboratory setting as such. 
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theories need to be formulated in such a way that they lend themselves to 
falsification. The controversy was based primarily on predicate logic, for the 
key question was whether, and how, general scientific propositions (“all x are 
F”) could be deduced from single experimental observations (“some x are F”). 
Controversies of this kind have long prevented philosophers of science from 
paying due attention to other aspects of scientific research, especially to 
various work processes in laboratories, field research, and other places of data 
triggering and collecting, as well as to the role(s) of modeling in cases where 
direct observation is strictly impossible. 
Positivists such as the members of the Vienna Circle were skeptical 
regarding propositions reaching beyond the limits of our perception. They 
claimed it would be inaccurate to assert that the temperature outside is 20º C, 
but accurate to assert that the thermometer displays 20º C on its visible scale. 
In contradistinction, contemporary realism, which is the dominant view among 
most scientists, claims that we can know, on the basis of observation(s), that 
things such as temperature, gravity, electrons, natural selection or neural 
networks actually exist. Contemporary realism also claims that we can 
corroborate theories beyond observation. 
In spite of these and similar claims, many realists pay a minimal amount 
of attention to how experimental data relate to the world researchers are 
supposed to elucidate. Experimental procedures risk thus to be taken to be 
indispensable in principle. Hence, they are mostly considered to be 
epistemologically irrelevant, for they are said to reveal by themselves some 
aspect of the natural world as it really is without adding anything to, or 
modifying somehow, the aspects of the world they are revealing. 
The case of fMRI is likely to show that this way of considering 
experimental procedures is short-sighted. Since fMRI procedures create the 
phenomena to be studied, one ought to dismiss the idea that such phenomena 
are simply there to be collected. To put some words from Ian Hacking’s 
remarkably apt argument: “To experiment is to create, produce, refine and 
stabilize phenomena. If phenomena were plentiful in nature, summer 
blackberries there just for the picking, it would be remarkable if experiments 
didn’t work. But phenomena are hard to produce in any stable way.” (Hacking 
1983, 230) And since experimental results depend on the phenomena at hand, 
results are also not just there to be picked like summer blackberries. Or with 
reference to Harré (2000, 274), let us say that scientific results cannot just be 
“read off the world.”10 
 
10 Many phenomena studied in scientific research, rather, are products emerging from of complex 
processes by which (a part of) nature is made readable by human beings within their conceptual, 
linguistic, and technical/instrumental frames.Without discussing Harré’s approach in detail, it follows 
from the main line of his arguments that experimental results are to be conceived as interpretations and 
that no interpretation is ultimately exclusive. 
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Harré also argues that there exists a (direct, simple) causal relation 
between aspects of the world and experimental apparatuses such as MRI 
machines (this also holds, of course, for fMRI studies, which rest on the 
use of MRI machines, as shown above). Hence, phenomena observed, 
registered, and measured in experiments may essentially depend upon 
apparatuses, whenever such apparatuses are used. This is to recapitulate 
that such phenomena are actively construed. Apparatuses are nonetheless 
part and parcel of the material world: they only exist in material form. 
Though causality holds within experiments, the relationship between 
experimental apparatus and world is and remains in part a semantic one. 
Apparatuses are ultimately, and in general, designed to help creating 
models. The latter are neither true nor false − they are more or less 
adequate or representative for the aspects of the world under examination. 
Such kinds of models (contrary to architectural or anatomical models) are 
successfully designed if and only if  they permit one to control, and 
actively manipulate, these aspects much more significantly than one would 
be able to do in nature. Thus, phenomena yielded in experiments by 
means of apparatuses are intrinsically bound to the latter by which they are 
produced. A straightforward causal relation to the world beyond the 
apparatuses is no longer warranted. In contradistinction, what apparatuses 
do reveal is a single disposition or a set of such dispositions, i.e. of 
possibilities of nature. In other words, experimental phenomena reveal 
“what Nature is capable of in conjunction with apparatus” (Harré 1998, 
369, our emphasis). Thus, transparency may be achieved rather between 
an experimental apparatus and nature’s disposition(s) captured by that 
apparatus, than between the experimental apparatus and nature’s actual 
states. 
Harré’s approach also offers an explanation for the relative stability of 
experimental results. Indeed, nature’s laws causally impinge upon 
apparatuses themselves as part of nature, in spite of the fact that these laws 
cannot be determined by way of experimentation based on apparatuses. 
An apparatus models nature more or less representatively, not directly, 
i.e. purely causally. Thus, experimenting turns out to be a way of 
systematically analyzing similarities and differences between a model and 
the aspect of the world the model is said to represent. However, 
apparatuses differ in the ways in which they embody analogies to the 
aspect(s) of nature, which they are expected to represent. In fact, the 
underlying relationship between apparatus and nature is intricate, for there 
exist apparatuses that lack even the slightest analogue in nature. The 
Wilson cloud chamber as a particle detector is thus a device that, as such, 
has no equivalent in ‘raw’ nature, although it helps to materially model 
some physical processes which take place in ‘raw’ nature. Likewise, 
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submicrometre cylindrical cavities in metallic films for experimentally 
exploring properties of light are a device that, due to its properties, is radically 
non-existent in ‘raw nature,’ although it permits to study, and thus to model, 
the behavior of light in nature (see Ebbesen et al. 1998). 
Hence, any apparatus fulfilling the criterion set by Harré’s definition is to 
be seen as a material model of some structure or process occurring in nature. It 
“reproduces an instance of a natural regularity that exists in the real world” 
(Harré 2010, p. 35). Above all, an apparatus is not just taken, or derived 
immediately, from nature, since it is something which is designed, has been 
constructed from scratch, and therefore has to have additional properties. It not 
only has to be economical, but also purified and standardized in order to allow 
reliable replications. This presupposes the availability of technical means 
industrially supplied11. 
To sum up, two important points obtain from these considerations: 
(a) Since the apparatus partakes of the material world and is causally 
subjected to manipulations, it should also be considered as something that 
affects the material world. Thus, the constructive character of apparatus-bound 
experiments yields experimental results that are inextricably bound to the 
technical arrangement at stake. This holds for fMRI as well, as this technique 
can be interpreted as an apparatus (not an instrument) in Harré’s sense. 
(b) The question as to how far we may back-infer from apparatuses to 
nature itself remains dependent upon a subtle balance between abstraction and 
verisimilitude. And this entails that the ‘art of the experimenter’ turns out to be 
a decisive factor in scientific research making more or less extensive use of 
apparatuses (Harré 2010, 36). To put it differently, “modeling is a scientific 
technique that requires a good deal of intuition and insight to be really 
effective” (Harré ibid, 36). It is never an affair that rests on some easy matter 
of facts. 
Furthermore, Harré distinguishes two types of apparatuses: 
First, working models of natural processes: There exist working models of 
natural processes within the material systems for which they count as models. 
Example: model organisms deliberately designed by genetic means such as a 
variety of rats exhibiting specific phenotypical traits, e.g. outstanding memory 
abilities or the propensity for fear. Although bred in a laboratory, such 
organisms could in principle have developed in nature without human 
intervention. A model organism qua apparatus of this sort is the material 
model of a piece of nature in ‘domesticated’ form. It is simpler, so to speak 
purer, more regular and thus more easily manipulable. In one word, it’s easier 
to experiment with. Although ontologically different from that part of nature 
under scrutiny, but similar to all other types of apparatus, model organisms 
 
11 This is a serious point as it presupposes a certain technological development of a society in order to 
provide technical devices such as MRT scanners. 
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rest on the simplified version of a set of phenomenona. In this case, 
experimenters do not aim at explaining the effects produced by the 
environment on the model organism qua apparatus, since they operate by 
transferring a piece of nature into the lab. This allows one to draw 
sometimes strong back-inferences from the experimental results to nature 
outside the laboratory (although back-inferences depend on how relations 
of similarity and difference are weighted by research aims). 
Apparatus as apparatus-world-complex: An apparatus of this type 
creates phenomenona that would not, and cannot, occur in nature, it 
literally produces artefacts. As it is not transcendent to the world, but has 
to be made epistemically operant in order to solve e.g. some strong 
theoretical paradox (such as the particle-wave-dualism in quantum 
mechanics). A lot of experimentally induced phenomena result from such 
apparatus-world-complexes (AWC). They turn out to be hybrids of human 
design and nature. This was, paradigmatically, the case in Humphry 
Davy’s isolation of sodium. As is well known, sodium does not exist in 
isolated form in nature. When dealing with “some chemical agencies of 
electricity”, he discovered that applying electricity to various chemical 
compounds, such as sulphate of sodium and phosphate of sodium (among 
several other similar compounds) (Davy 1807, 18), pure sodium obtained 
by decomposition within the borders of the apparatus, i.e. in the AWC 
(Davy ibid., 12). To describe Davy’s experiments in other terms, the 
“powerful electrical machine” designed by a certain Mr Nairne (Davy 
ibid., 31) was set up so that it constituted a model of a fragment of nature 
where, due to manipulations, decomposition of chemical compounds 
containing sodium atoms occurred. However, without this specific AWC, 
without this piece of experimentally ‘domesticated’ nature, where laws of 
nature did neither fail nor even slightly change, the “powerful machine” 
that had created a micro-universe where dispositions of natural matter 
could manifest themselves previously unheard of and unobserved, pure 
sodium would not have been isolated. The decomposition of sodium 
compounds was artificial, i.e. experimentally and artfully induced in, 
through, by, and thanks to Davy’s AWC. 
Back-inferences to nature are often difficult to draw in AWCs, for 
their ontological status as compared to the ontology of nature ‘pure and 
simple’ is unclear. Indeed, the true contribution of an apparatus to the 
production of phenomenona is not transparent from the outset (cf. again 
Davy’s extensive reports on his experiments on the chemical agencies of 
electricity). Therefore, AWCs cannot be conceived of as instances that 
unmediatedly actualize properties of nature, that is, the principle of 
actualism has to be dropped. Instead, we can only speak of potentialities of 
nature that are made available by AWCs, or of affordances, to refer to 
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Harré’s terms.12 Indeed, each affordance is relative to what humans intend to 
do with it − it “would not have existed without human action to bring it into 
being“ (Harré 2010, 37). 
4. Functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) 
scanners as AWCs13 
Let us go back to the issue of fMRI. It follows from the critical 
reconstruction of Harré’s approach that he conceives of experiments as 
instances that necessarily remain related to nature (rather than being just 
merely symbolized within the scientific discourse − according to some 
postmodernist approaches), while rejecting at the same time the traditional 
claim of transparency. To put it in simpler words: experimental apparatuses do 
not reveal states in the world as these states are in and by themselves. As 
indicated above, Harré argues for the non-eliminable, constructive character of 
experimental apparatuses; at the same time, however, he emphasizes that there 
is a world ‘out there’ to which apparatuses necessarily relate. Neither the 
world itself nor apparatuses by themselves reveal the phenomena considered to 
be relevant for the elaboration of scientific results, since both indissolubly melt 
into some AWC. 
Concerning fMRI scanners, we claim that the most popular and common 
experimental devices of cognitive neuroscience are members of the AWC-
type. The AWCs are intelligently designed and carefully manufactured 
machines that create, as one could say, pieces of ‘domesticated’ tissues ready 
to be used as material models of real, organic, living tissue to which they refer. 
Nowhere in nature do we encounter differences in blood magnetization due to 
a magnetic field whose force is thousands of times stronger than magnetic 
fields to be observed on earth’s surface. As AWCs, fMRI scanners (in 
conjunction with MRI scanners) model the anatomy of the brain as well as 
 
12 Harré refers to James Gibson’s idea of affordance. 
13 The italian physiologist Angelo Mosso (1846-1910) is given credit for having devised the first 
instruments to non-invasively measure the redistribution of cerebral blood in response to cognitive tasks. 
Therefore, he is often seen as a father of functional magnetic resonance imaging (Sandone et al., 2014). 
Originally, Mosso had devised a plethysmograph to register alternations in cerebral blood flow from the 
dura mater in patients with skull defects. He related these alternations to different states of vigilance in 
the subjects or to cognitive tasks such as listening to their names or to a striking clock (Zago et al., 2009). 
In order to do similar studies in healthy subjects, Mosso devised a “human circulation balance.” Subjects 
lay on a wooden table that was balanced on a pivotal point. In a sophisticated experimental procedure, 
Mosso aimed at demonstrating that cognitive and affective tasks were leading to increased blood flow to 
the brain, thereby changing the equilibrum in which the lying subject had been set towards head side. 
Interestingly, Mosso’s device would be different from fMRI as it would have to count as an instrument 
sensu Harré rather than an apparatus (such as fMRI) (for the instrument vs. apparatus distinction, see 
above). In both Mosso’s plethymosgraph and his circulation balance there is a direct causal connection 
between states in the world (changes in cerebral blood flow) and changes in the instrument (amplitude or 
tilt of balance, respectively). 
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cerebral functions by means of highly sophisticated techniques of data 
production, where the relationship to natural phenomenona (the 
physiology in nature’s brains) is opaque and by material necessity linked 
to the structure of the machinery. Thus, the assertion according to which 
neuroscientific data are “extracted from the physical world by technical 
measuring devices such as [...] functional MRI scanners” (Metzinger, 
2004, 591) is totally misconceived if based on a realist interpretation of 
fMRI data, to say the least, and at worst simply wrong. 
Due to their design, MRI scanners make good candidates for Bohrian 
apparatus-world-complexes. As we have argued above, back inferences 
from AWCs to the natural world beyond human intervention are 
inherently problematic, as their status with respect to nature remains 
opaque. Of course, brains in laboratories causally affect fMRI data. These 
data, however, do not allow us to directly conclude what brains in nature 
actually do, as the technique of MRI scanners produces phenomena not to 
be found in nature. Thus, the relationship between fMRI data and natural 
brains is not a causal one. It has to be judged on the basis of adequacy, i. e. 
of whether the lab situation of a magnetic field of e.g. 3 T provides an 
appropriate model for brains active outside the scanner in a natural 
magnetic field of 35 microtesla. 
The best way to make sense of the epistemological status of Bohrian 
apparatuses (such as MRI and fMRI scanners) is to assume that they 
actualize a potentiality of the world, not an actuality. Thus, the fMRI 
scanner may help to systematically manipulate parts of the world (i.e. 
brains) for good or for bad, but they seem hardly apt to straightforwardly 
reveal by themselves, if considered to be self-controlled agencies, 
anything about the essence of the mind (i.e. about one part of the world as 
it is). 
 
5. Conclusion 
When apparatuses (in Harré’s sense) such as MRI, fMRI, and 
similarly conceived equipments are at stake, their functioning and their 
output(s) entail some far-reaching consequence, as the present analytic 
reconstruction is meant to show. The relation holding between the 
observing, measuring, experimenting subjects, on the one hand, and the 
target objects, on the other hand, reveals itself to be epistemically 
significantly different from the relation holding between the said subjects 
and their instruments vis-à-vis the target objects given (so to speak) 
without some intervention caused by the means of observation and 
measurement. The distance between two points in space is not altered 
when being measured by a folding rule; human heartbeat is in itself not 
altered by the stethoscope. However, neither colliding subatomic particles 
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in helium chambers nor activated brain states are (literally) seen when 
examined on displays, films, and other means. Which is to say that the verbs to 
see, to observe, to measure are semantically and epistemically flexible and 
need to be specified according to the context of research procedures and 
equipments. 
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